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THE CURE CAUSES NEW SYMPTOMS:
CAPITAL CONTROL EFFECTS OF
TAX ENFORCEMENT, GOLD REGULATION,
AND RETIREMENT REFORM
Beckett G. Cantley*
INTRODUCTION

For the last five years, the United States government has devoted
significant attention and resources to how U.S. taxpayers are investing
their money with special focus on offshore investments, gold, and
retirement savings. In 2006, Congress held hearings and issued a
report' on the offshore banking activities of U.S. taxpayers that led U.S.
Senator Carl Levin to state that the "universe of offshore tax cheating
has become so large that no one, not even the United States
government, could go after all of it." 2 The hearings and report began a
flurry of activity by the United States government intended to crack
down on the use of offshore bank accounts by U.S. citizens. This
included forcing a major Swiss bank to break Swiss law by breaching
the confidentiality of its clients by providing information to U.S.

. Beckett G. Cantley (University of California, Berkley, B.A. 1989,
Southwestern University School of Law, J.D. cum laude, 1995; and University
of Florida, College of Law, LL.M. in Taxation, 1997) is a Visiting Associate
Professor of Law at Atlanta's John Marshall Law School and a Professor of
Law in the Diamond Program at Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Prof.
Cantley would like to thank Prof. Bruce Luna for his initial work, and Chase
Cannon and Taila Martin for their assistance as a Research Assistants on this
article.

I STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG.,
REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY
(Subcomm. Print Aug. 1, 2006) (prepared by Chairman Norm Coleman &
http://levin.senate.gov/
Carl
Levin),
Member
Minority
Ranking
see also Press
newsroom/supporting/2006/PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf;
Release from Carl Levin, U.S. Sen., PermanentSubcommittee on Investigations
Issues Report On Offshore Tax Haven Abuses That Cost U.S. Taxpayers Over
$40 Billion Each Year (August 1, 2006), http://levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/release.cfm?id=260030 (publicizing the purpose of the upcoming
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing).
2 David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/01/business/0ltax.html.
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authorities.
In addition to cracking down on offshore tax cheats,
Congress passed the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE)
Act, 4 which created a tougher regulatory environment for foreign
financial institutions with bank or investment accounts for U.S.
taxpayers.s The HIRE Act regime may result in foreign banking
institutions collecting taxes directly from their U.S. clients and
remitting them to the U.S. Treasury. 6 Increased attention, regulation,
7
and high profile criminal prosecution activity provides a huge
deterrent to U.S. taxpayers with investments outside the United States
to maintain their foreign investments offshore. Increased pressure and
regulation is also making offshore financial institutions question their
business relationships with U.S. taxpayers and weigh the risk and
rewards of continuing these relationships.
In addition to these offshore measures, in 2008, Congress
broadened its focus on U.S. investors to include their domestic

See I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-75, IRS to Receive Unprecedented
Amount of Information in UBS Agreement (Aug 19, 2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=212124,00.html; David Voreacos
and Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Wants UBS to Break Swiss Law By Naming Clients,
Bank
Says,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
21,
2009,
12:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=a46wlV8SdXG
4. See also Barbara T. Kaplan, Offshore Accounts: Too Late to Fess Up?,
FORBES.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 4:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/29/irsubs-swiss-offshore-amnesty-personal-finance-voluntary-disclosure.html; Kevin
McCoy, IRS: Offshore Tax Crackdown Should Produce 'Billions,' USA TODAY
(Nov. 18, 2009, 12:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/200911-17-offshore-tax-evaders-irs N.htm. See generally U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 0920423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009) (denying UBS's
motion to compel disclosure of the number of accounts targeted by a John Doe
Summons, in which the U.S. seeks to compel production of records regarding
taxpayers who had accounts managed by UBS from 2002 to 2007 for which
UBS did not have Forms W-9 and did not file Forms 1099 naming such U.S.
taxpayers and such payments made to those taxpayers).
4 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124
Stat. 71 (2010) (providing a tougher regulatory environment for foreign
financial institutions by requiring such institutions to comply with numerous
reporting and disclosure requirements).
' See id. § 1472(a-d).
6 See id.

7 See generally U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122
(S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009); U.S. Dep't of Justice News Release 09-136, UBS
Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), available at
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax- 136.html.
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decisions as well.' Congress enacted legislation which, in 2012, will
require all businesses to issue an IRS Form 1099 to any individual or
corporation from which they buy goods or services in excess of $600 in
a tax year.9 This change implicates gold companies, which are thus
required to report extensive information to the IRS for each sale of gold
in excess of 0.43 ounces based on prices as of December 1, 2010.o In
addition to the reporting requirement, Congress also recently passed
legislation requiring gold companies to report if certain countries are
the source of the gold they sell to U.S. citizens, whether onshore or
offshore." Further, the Dodd-Frank Act restricts U.S. gold dealers
from contracting with certain countries that supply gold to the market.12
These regulatory regimes will likely reduce the number of gold dealers
and significantly increase the compliance costs for remaining gold
dealers. These increased compliance costs will be passed on to gold
investors and generally make it more expensive for U.S. taxpayers to
invest in gold. Consequently, the net result is that increased gold
regulation will likely result in an increased cost of investing in gold,
and thus U.S. investors are more likely to avoid gold and seek
alternative investments.
In 2008, Congress also began examining retirement investment
One proposal under consideration, the Guaranteed
vehicles.
Retirement Account ("GRA"), calls for a "$600 refundable tax credit,
which takes the place of tax breaks for 401(k)s and similar individual
accounts" as a way of paying for a partially government-funded, broadbased, government-managed retirement account system.13 The Social
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-

148, §9006, 124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010) ("[F]or purposes of this section the term
'person' includes any corporation that is not an organization exempt from tax
under section 501(a).").
9 See § 9006, 124 Stat. at 855 (amending section 6041 of the Internal
Revenue Code); see also Neil deMause, Health Care Law's Massive, Hidden

Tax Change, CNNMONEY.COM
(May 5, 2010, 11:00
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/05/smallbusiness/1099_health-care tax change/.
'o

See, e.g., Matt Whittaker, Gold Edges Up to $1387.30, WALL ST. J.

(December

1,

2010,

4:54

PM),

http://online.wsj.com/article/

SBI0001424052748704594804575648412929325780.html.
11Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
12 d
3 Teresa Ghilarducci, GuaranteedRetirement Accounts: Toward Retirement
Income Security, EcoN. POLICY INST. (Nov. 2007), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
see also The
programs/lwp/GuaranteedRetirementAccountsnovember.pdf,
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Security Administration would administer the GRAs in addition to
existing Social Security benefits.14 Without a tax incentive, 401(k)
plans would likely cease to exist, making Social Security and GRAs the
principal retirement investment vehicles for many Americans.
However, Congressional borrowing from the Social Security Trust
Fund for non-Social Security spending's has resulted in a Treasury debt
to the Trust Fund in excess of $2.6 billion.' 6 Implementation of GRAs
would provide the federal government with an entirely new source of
capital to raid to meet current spending needs. In essence, taxpayers
would be nudged out of Section 401(k) plans and into a governmentheld and government-managed retirement system that the Treasury
could borrow against.
While each of the policies discussed above individually has a
direct, laudable public protection purpose, the cumulative effect of
these activities makes it more likely that U.S. investors are discouraged
from investing in non-preferred locations, like offshore; asset classes,
like gold; and vehicles, like Section 401(k) plans. Instead, these
policies direct U.S. investors to preferred domestic locations; preferred
asset classes, like U.S. Treasury bonds; and preferred investment
vehicles, like GRAs. These measures comprise a network of capital
controls that use regulation, incentives, taxes, and the threat of civil
and/or criminal penalties to incentivize taxpayers into directing their
investments where the U.S. government has more disclosure, control,
and access to the capital. It is impossible to know whether the current

Impact of the Financial Crisis on Workers' Retirement Security: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 38 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing on

Workers'Retirement Security] (statement of Teresa Ghilarducci, Irene and Bernard
L. Schwartz Professor of Econ. Policy Analysis, The New Sch. for Soc. Research,
Dep't of Econ), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=1 10_house hearings&docid-f:44713.pdf.
14Hearingon Workers'Retirement Security, supra note 13, at 32.

15 According to the Social Security Administration, the government
borrows current cash flows in place of special issue securities for future
obligations. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., TRUST FUND
DATA: TRUST FUND FAQs (Aug. 5, 2010) [hereinafter TRUST FUND FAQs],

http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/fundFAQ.html; see also, Jeanne Sahadi,
Social Security Looms for Next President, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 27, 2008
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/25/news/economy/socsec_
PM),
3:17

candidates-trustees/.
16 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., TRUST FUND DATA:

INVESTMENT HOLDINGS (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/cgi-

bin/investheld.cgi.
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7
U.S. budget and debt crises are driving these actions.' However, it is
possible that these policies are driven by the government's need of
access to capital, particularly in light of the government's willingness
to step on the toes of sovereign governments and historic allies, such as
Switzerland.

Regardless of whether this capital control effect is intended,
these policies make investing offshore more burdensome, make
investing in gold more expensive and propose a radical shift in capital
flow from private retirement accounts into a government-controlled
retirement system at a time when the U.S. government is running a
huge deficit. This paper discusses the concepts of international and
domestic capital control, the current actions of the government
referenced above, and the capital control effect of these government
actions.
I. CAPITAL CONTROLS
A. DEFINING CAPITAL CONTROL
Capital controls are laws or regulations designed to impede the
movement or exchange of capital (often in the form of currency) across
national borders.18 Nations develop capital control regimes for several
1 Former senator Alan Simpson and former White House Chief of Staff
Erskine Bowles were appointed to co-chair the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform in February 2010. In commenting on the current
fiscal state, Senator Simpson and Bowles respectively said, "[w]e find
ourselves in a difficult fiscal situation that is unsustainable," and "[t]his debt is
like a cancer." Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary,
President Obama Establishes Bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/president-obama-establishes-bipartisan-national-commissionfiscal-responsibility-an; Balz, Dan, Obama's Debt Commission Warns ofFiscal
'Cancer', WASH. POST (July 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/1 l/AR2010071101956.html.
18 Currency control comes in a variety of forms, including restrictions on
an individual's or business entity's ability to either possess foreign currency or
have access to currency abroad. See Robert L. Maines, The Interest
Equalization Tax, 17 STAN. L. REV. 711, 721-22 (1965) (discussing the interest
equalization tax's ability to equalize "the cost of foreign borrowing in the
United States with costs in foreign capital markets"); James Cooper, Spirits in
the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to United States Trade Policy,
14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 957, 1021-23 (1999) ("It is well known that erecting
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different reasons, including the protection of domestic investment in its
Governments engage in currency control through
economy.' 9
regulation of capitalization requirements, limitation of the amount of
foreign exchange, or taxation of certain cash flows. 20 Governments do
this primarily to protect the local balance of payments or promote
exports of businesses that cannot otherwise compete on the
international market. 21 Capital constantly moves from country to
country, converting from one country's currency to another. 22 These
movements consist of capital entering a country, "inflows," and leaving
a country, "outflows." 23 This paper is specifically focused on capital
outflow controls.
B. CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL OUTFLOW

In the international context, the term "capital outflow" refers to
the net amount of capital that flows out of a country. 24 The net amount
is determined by subtracting the amount of foreign assets purchased
with domestic capital from the amount of domestic assets purchased

barriers to the free flow of goods and services across national borders
undermines the division of labor and standards of living by impeding the
adjustment of the capital stock to its most productive uses.").
19See Daniel Griswold, ProtectionismNo Fixfor China's Currency, CATO

INST. (Jun. 25, 2005), http://www.cato.org/pub display.php?pubid=3946.
20 See Mary E. Footer, GATT and the MultilateralRegulation of Banking
Services, 27 INT'L LAW. 343, 362-63 (1993); Raj Bhala, Virtues, Chinese Yuan,
and the American Empire, 38 HONG KONG L.J. 183, 203 (2008); Am. Bar

Ass'n, International Legal Developments in Review: 2007, Regional and
ComparativeLaw: Russia and Ukraine, 42 INT'L LAW. 1083, 1090 (2008).

21 See Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payment Crises in the Developing
World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic
Order, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1249 (2000); Chris Brown, China's GA 7T Bid:
Why All the Fuss About Currency Controls?, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 57, 63

(1994).
22 At the heart of currency control is the regulation of a currency's
convertibility. Since the flow of capital is often a taxable event, the existence of
external convertibility is an important consideration for foreign firms intending
to invest in a local economy in order to repatriate profits. See Stephen J.
McGarry, Pathfinderfor Doing Business Abroad, 522 INT'L LAW. 483, 506

(1988).
23 James Oliver, What are CapitalControls?,THE UNIV. OF IOWA CTR. FOR

INT'L FIN. & DEv.,
controls.shtml.
24

http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/faq_docs/capital

N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNoMics 696 (1st ed. 1997).
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26
Capital
with foreign capital. 25 The difference is the capital outflow.
assets
domestic
outflows are "negative" when the foreign purchasing of
27
Capital
assets.
of
foreign
purchase
is higher than the domestic
outflows are "positive" when the domestic purchasing of foreign assets
is higher than the foreign purchase of domestic assets.28

There are several ways that a country can prevent positive capital
outflow. Capital control methodologies vary in degree of severity.
Some methods involve strict rules about capital movement, including
but not limited to: placing severe regulations on financial institutions to
limit capital outflow from domestic institutions to offshore institutions,
limiting the types of transactions where capital can be removed from
the country, or devaluing currencies in order to limit capital flight and
promote exports. 29 Governments adopting strict rules aspire to limit
transactions in order to prohibit positive capital outflow. For example,
China has employed strict capital controls allegedly in order to
30
Less
manipulate its currency and create negative capital outflow.
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

See Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, CapitalControls: Theory and Practice, 1
J. Bus. & PUB. AFF. (2007), available at http://www.scientificjoumals.org/
joumals2007/articles/1011.htm; see also, Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Regional
FinancialInstitutionalizationand the Creationof a Zone of Law: The Context
of Financial Stability/Regulation in East Asia, 35 INT'L LAW. 1627, 1644
(2001).
30 China's manipulation of the exchange rate for its currency, the
Renminbi ("RMB"), limits the transfer of RMB out of China. See, e.g., Belinda
Cao, China Will Expand Cross-Border Yuan Settlement, Offshore Usage,
AM),
12:34
2010,
17,
(Sep.
BLOOMBERG
Says,
PBOC
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-17/china-will-expand-cross-borderyuan-settlement-offshore-usage-pboc-says.html; Andrew Batson, China Says It
Will Increase Yuan's Flexibility, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 20, 2010, 1:19 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704365204575316382930451
658.html. The RMB of China, is not freely traded, but is instead subject to a
managed floating exchange-rate regime. See UPDATE: PBOC Yi: Current FX
Regime 'Best Choice'for China - State Media, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2011,
7:34 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110213-704194.html. Only
members of the foreign exchange market may trade the RMB and membership
is limited to a select number of authorized foreign exchange banks and
financial institutions. The member banks must trade the RMB within a small
band around the announced exchange rates. See Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze
Ning Leung, Is China a 'Currency Manipulator'?:The Legitimacy of China's
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strict capital outflow controls can take the form of inducements or
penalties that encourage investors to keep their capital in country.
1. INDUCEMENTS
Inducements may include more advantageous tax or regulatory
treatment for domestic investments. For example, the United States
offers tax credits to investors investing in domestic alternative energy
enterprises. Since tax credits reduce the actual amount of taxes paid, a
tax credit for domestic research is a very valuable incentive for U.S.
taxpayers to fund domestic alternative energy investments.
Additionally, the U.S. currently offers several inducements to
incentivize and encourage home ownership. First, a federal deduction
for interest paid on loans secured by a qualified home. 3 1 This valuable
deduction has been available to homeowners since Congress enacted
federal income tax in 1913 and is allowable on first homes, second
homes, or equity loans or lines of credit used to substantially improve
your home.32 The home mortgage interest deduction has effectively
operated as a valuable inducement since the home mortgage deduction
was saved in 1986 when the U.S. eliminated personal interest
Exchange Regime under the Current InternationalLegal Framework, 43 INT'L

1257, 1262-3 (2009). In addition to exchange rate controls, China strictly
regulates the ability all individuals and businesses within China to price or
settle accounts in a foreign currency, except in Hong Kong and Macao. China
also regulates foreign exchange earnings by mandating any income from a
China-based organization be remitted back into China and deposited in an
authorized foreign exchange bank. These authorized foreign exchange banks
also are prohibited from making unauthorized deposits of foreign exchange
outside Chinese territory. See Regulations of the People's Republic of China on
Foreign Exchange Control (promulgated by Order No. 211, 1997 of the State
LAW.

Council, effective Jan. 14, 1997), http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/
law en info.jsp?docid=73096 (China); Chris Brown, China's GATTBid: Why
All the Fuss About Currency Controls, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 57, 61-62

(1994).
31

A qualified home under IRS regulation is a house, cooperative,

condominium, mobile home, boat, house trailer or similar property, which has
sleeping, cooking, and toilet facilities. I.R.S., Dept. of the Treasury, Publication

936, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (Nov. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p936.pdf.
32 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-769, HOME MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTION: DESPITE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY COMPLEX TAX
RULES, IRS COULD ENHANCE ENFORCEMENT AND GUIDANCE (JULY 2009),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09769.pdf.
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Secondly, the federal government offered an $8,000
deductions.
homebuyer tax credit for first time home purchasers under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.34 Historically, the

use of tax deductions and credits has been an effective means for the
federal government to use fiscal policy to induce Americans into the
types of investments the government values.
2. PENALTIES
Penalties can include higher costs or taxes imposed on foreign
investments.35 For example, taxing domestic taxpayers who invest in
foreign assets deters the taxpayer from making the investment unless
the investment's profit, less the taxes, exceeds the expected return of an
investment not subject to the same capital control tax regime. The
Federal Transfer Tax is an example of this type of capital control
penalty. The Federal Excise Tax is often triggered by sending capital
into an offshore insurance policy. 36 However, a transfer of the same
capital to a domestic insurance policy would not trigger any Federal
Excise Tax.37 This government-created tax acts as a penalty and
discourages the company from sending the capital outside the United
States.
Additionally, the recently enacted38 Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment (HIRE) Act is funded in part by its incorporation of the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA") and the FATCA's
3 Id.
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,

34 I.R.S.,

REINVESTMENT

ACT

OF

THE AMERICAN

2009: INFORMATION

CENTER

RECOVERY

(July

6,

AND

2010),

http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=204335,00.html.
3s One method of controlling capital outflow is by taxing the capital as it
leaves the country ("Exit Tax"). For example, Malaysia and the Philippines
impose "Departure Taxes" to individuals before being allowed to leave the
country. See Yokoi-Aria, supra,note 29.
36 I.R.S., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,

AUDIT

TECHNIQUE

GUIDE

FOREIGN INSURANCE EXCISE TAX -

(Jan.

28,

2011),

(discussing
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=186963,00.html
how tax rates are dependent on the structure of captive insurance policy).
3 See generally Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Avoidance and the
Definition of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive Insurance
Companies, 40 CASE W. REs. L. Rev. 79, 112 (1990).
38

The Hire Act was signed into law on March 18, 2010. See CCH Tax

Briefing: 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, CCH (March 18,

2010), http://tax.cchgroup.com/legislation/Hire-Act.pdf.
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series of reporting and disclosure requirements with significant
penalties for non-compliance. 39 The FATCA mandates significant
disclosures to the U.S. Treasury Department by foreign entities
receiving U.S. taxpayers' investment funds. 40 The increased cost of the
mandated disclosures will likely have one of two effects: (1) the foreign
entity may enter into an agreement with the IRS to follow IRS
procedures and guidelines that prohibit the foreign entity from
maintaining any U.S. investment, or (2) the foreign entity may pass
along the costs of the mandated disclosures to U.S. investors. 41 Thus,
the regulation is an example of a penalty that is directly intended to
raise U.S. revenue and domestic investment because it adversely affects
foreign investment through both a reduction in the available market of
potential foreign investment (for those foreign entities who elect to
enter into an agreement with the IRS as provided for in the FATCA) or
an increase in the cost of foreign investment.
3. THE U.S. GOAL OF CAPITAL OUTFLOW CONTROL:
INCREASING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO DOMESTIC CAPITAL
The United States budget deficits and national debt are currently
larger than anytime in history. 42 In order to sustain current levels of
government spending, the U.S. government must find additional
sources of capital to borrow against. The United States may acquire the
needed funds by increasing tax receipts (derived from income
generated by U.S. taxpayers' investment of domestic capital) or by
borrowing. Increasing tax receipts is done most easily by ensuring it is
invested domestically where the IRS more easily monitor and collect
taxes from its earnings. Borrowing against domestic capital is also a
potential source of revenue. The U.S. Social Security Trust Fund has
been a consistent source of revenue funding deficit spending. 43 Before
3 Jeffrey R. Davine & Wayne R. Strasbaugh, FATCA, HIRE Act Hold
Ramificationsfor Foreign Investment in U.S., BNA TAX & ACCOUNTING (April

20, 2010), http://www.bnatax.com/insightsdetail.aspx?id=2147484779.
40 FATCA requires disclosure of U.S. investment accounts that are
prospectively valued at $50,000 at any point during the year. Id.
41
42

id.
id.

42 See generally Andrew Woellner, Spending on an Empty Wallet: A
Critique of Tax Expenditures and the Current FiscalPolicy, 7 Hous. Bus. &

TAX L.J. 201 (2006).
43 According to the Social Security Administration, the government
borrows current cash flows in place of special issues for future obligations. See
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, supra note 15; Sahadi, supra note 15.
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the U.S. government can borrow against domestic capital, it must
ensure that the U.S. economy in general has negative capital outflow
relative to possible international investments.
C. U.S. INTERNAL DOMESTIC CAPITAL CONTROL
1. DEFINING INTERNAL DOMESTIC CAPITAL CONTROL
Once the government has implemented capital outflow controls
to attempt to keep domestic capital in the country, the government may
then make inducements, set up a penalty regime, or create restrictions
that are likely to lead the domestic capital to be invested in a manner
that provides increased government revenue opportunities. In theory,
the U.S. government has two normative approaches to choose from
when adopting internal domestic capital controls: strict or less strict.
The theoretical strict approach could include absolute bans on domestic
investment overseas, mandatory currency conversion from the Dollar to
foreign currencies, or both. The theoretical less-strict view incentivizes
taxpayers away from private investment into government investment
assets like Treasury bonds. This approach is also described as a
"government asset preference" form of internal domestic capital
control.
While the government asset preference form of capital control is
potentially a preference between two domestic asset classes (private
sector investments versus government issued debt and other
government-preferred investments), it is very similar to an "outflow"
capital control. This type of control substitutes the investment in
government issued debt (and other government-preferred investments)
for the term "domestic investment" and the non-preferred investment
(foreign or domestic private sector investments) for the term "foreign
investment." The government is using its regulatory and taxing power
to require and influence taxpayers to invest their capital in governmentpreferred destinations. If the government can make use of domestic tax
resources by means of these devices, then it has shown a historical
willingness to do so.45
4 Ethan Kaplan & Dani Rodrik, Did the Malaysian Capital Controls
Work? 8 (NBER Working Paper No. W8142, 2001), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/Malaysia%20contr
ols.PDF.

45 See, e.g., I.R.S., Dept. of the Treasury, Publication 15, (CircularE),
Employer's Tax Guide (Dec. 29, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
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2. THE U.S. GOAL: TURNING CAPITAL OUTFLOW INTO
GOVERNMENT TAX RECEIPTS & BORROWING SOURCES
The large U.S. budget deficitS46 and national debt47 requires the
government to maximize access to capital and increase revenue
opportunities targeting this capital or borrow from it as the government

has done with Social Security. 48 The principal reason for using
domestic capital controls to drive assets into government investments is
to obtain access to U.S. taxpayer investments in order to sustain
government solvency. The U.S. government clearly needs additional
sources of capital in whatever form it can be obtained. However, to
reach the goal of increasing government access to capital, the
government must first keep U.S. domestic capital from going overseaswhich is a likely byproduct of the deterrent effect on U.S. taxpayers
created by the IRS attack on offshore accounts.
II. THE IRS OFFSHORE TAx ENFORCEMENT CRACKDOWN

A. THE OPENING SHOT: THE PSI HEARINGS

On August 1, 2006, the United States Senate's Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) 49 began hearings on the depth

irs-pdf/pl5.pdf- U.S.

DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, RESOURCE CENTER: HISTORY OF

THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM (Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-

center/faqs/Taxes/Pages/historyrooseveltmessage.aspx.
46 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Monthly Budget Review: Fiscal Year 2010
(November 5, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/

doc11873/NovemberMBR.pdf ("The federal government recorded a total
budget deficit of $1.4 trillion in fiscal year 2010, $122 billion less than the
deficit incurred in 2009."); Woellner, supra note 42, at 7.
47 Michael D. Tanner, The Deficit is a Symptom, Spending is the Disease,
NAT'L
REVIEW
ONLINE
(Aug.
25,
2010,
4:00
AM),

http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/244616/deficit-symptom-spendingdisease-michael-tanner (projecting the U.S. national debt in excess of $13.4
Trillion).
48 The U.S. takes taxpayer dollars flowing into the Social Security Trust
Fund and invests it into U.S. back securities (short and long term indebtedness
known as "special issues" available only to the Social Security Trust Fund) and
spends the borrowed cash. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, supra note 15;

Sahadi, supra note 15.
49 The PSI is a branch of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY &
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and scope of Americans use of unreported foreign bank accounts. U.S.
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) brought the matter before the
subcommittee.5 0 The Subcommittee's report effectively fired the first
shot in the coming U.S. attack on the use of unreported offshore
accounts by U.S. citizens.
In conjunction with the hearings, PSI released a report on their
findings ("2006 PSI Report"). 5 1 The 2006 PSI Report and a subsequent
report entitled Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance ("2008 PSI

Report") 52 provided extensive information and statistics evidencing the
magnitude of offshore banking by U.S. taxpayers.5 3 The PSI reports
described in detail several high-level tax schemes, where American
taxpayers have used "billing schemes, management consultant
agreements, and intermediary corporations .

.

. to distance themselves

from the [offshore] entities and obscure the links between them." 54 The
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=Subcommittees.Home (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
so Press Release from Carl Levin, U.S. Sen., Statement of Senator Carl
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Levin on Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, Part I (Mar. 2, 2009),

http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=308945
(publicizing
purpose of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act).
5 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,

the

109TH
CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY

(Subcomm. Print Aug. 1, 2006) (prepared by Chairman Norm Coleman &

Ranking Minority Member Carl Levin), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
supporting/2006/PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf (released in conjunction with
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Aug. 1, 2006 Hearing).
52 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONs, 109TH
CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE (Subcomm.
Print July 17, 2008) (prepared by Chairman Carl Levin & Ranking Minority
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ files/
Member
Norm
Coleman),
071708PSIReport.pdf (released in conjunction with Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations July 17, 2008 Hearing).
53 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SuncoMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG.,
REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY

(Subcomm. Print Aug. 1, 2006) (prepared by Chairman Norm Coleman &
Ranking Minority Member Carl Levin), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
STAFF OF S. PERMANENT
supporting/2006/PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf;
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND
U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE (Subcomm. Print July 17, 2008) (prepared by Chairman
Carl
Levin
&
Ranking
Minority
Member
Norm
Coleman),
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
54 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG.,
REP. ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 29

(Subcomm. Print Aug. 1, 2006) (prepared by Chairman Norm Coleman &
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2006 PSI Report concluded that the extent of the offshore tax fraud is
55
so severe that law enforcement is unable to competently control it.
Switzerland and Lichtenstein were the primary offshore jurisdictions
targeted by the PSI and the IRS in response to international tax
scandals that revealed a large number of U.S. taxpayers taking
56
advantage of the strict bank secrecy laws in those jurisdictions.

B. INCREASING U.S. TAX RE VENUE BY HIGHER TAX
COMPLIANCE
Historically, IRS found it difficult to uncover and prosecute
offshore tax evasion because the criminal transactions are very complex
particularly due to the multiplicity and sophistication of relationships
Additionally, these transactions take
between tax-shelter entities.
place in non-transparent offshore jurisdictions where the U.S. lacks
authority to obtain necessary information.58 The offshore schemes
59
targeted by the PSI reduce tax revenue by as much as $300 million.

Ranking Minority Member Carl Levin), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
supporting/2006/PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf.
5 Id. at 11-16.
56 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG.,

REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 2 (Subcomm. Print July

17, 2008) (prepared by Chairman Carl Levin & Ranking Minority Member
Norm Coleman), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
5 Tax Compliance - Offshore FinancialActivity Creates Enforcement
Issues for the IRS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., I 1th Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter Hearings on Enforcement Issues] (statement of Michael Brostek,
Director of Strategic Issues Team), in U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

GAO-09-478T (Mar. 17, 2009), at 7, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09478t.pdf.
58 Uncovering illegal activity is another reason for the U.S. government's
crackdown on offshore tax havens. It is possible that strict offshore secrecy
rules (like those in Switzerland) likely assist in shielding the proceeds of
criminal activity from scrutiny by U.S. authorities. Bank secrecy laws allow
offshore service providers to go to extraordinary lengths to protect clients'
identities and financial information. These perks hinder tax and regulatory
authorities so thoroughly that enforcement is nearly impossible. The removal of
these bank secrecy laws would dramatically increase the U.S. government's
ability to monitor its citizens' financial situations. See Press Release from Carl
Levin, U.S. Sen., Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Introducing the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act, Part I (Feb. 17, 2007), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
release.cfm?id=269514 (discussing taxpayer abuse of offshore tax shelters and
the need for enforcement of U.S. tax laws).
" See id.
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Given the large budgetary problems the U.S. currently has, this lost tax
revenue is a very important issue. Senator Levin said that offshore tax
non-compliance is "undermining the integrity of the [American] tax
system and renders the government unable to pay for critical needs,
avoid going deeper into debt, and protect honest taxpayers."6o As the
IRS began implementing the offshore crackdown to intimidate noncompliant taxpayers with foreign bank accounts, it also offered an
escape for non-compliant taxpayers willing to voluntarily disclose, pay
a penalty and resolved their balance with the IRS.6
1. THE VDI INCENTIVE
On March 23, 2009, the IRS announced the Voluntary Disclosure
Initiative (VDI) to encourage taxpayers with unreported offshore bank
accounts to report hidden assets. 62 VDI participation significantly 63
reduces penalties for unpaid taxes for individuals and companies.64
VDI was limited to a six-month window for applicants to become
compliant under the program65 and was available for taxpayers with a
legal income source who are willing to make timely, accurate, and
complete disclosures to the IRS and pay (or make arrangements to pay)
the taxes due. 66 The IRS's intent was two-fold: to provide an incentive
to become compliant 7 and recover lost revenue.

60

id.

61 See generally Alan

Winston Granwell et al., IRS Issues New Voluntary

Disclosure Guidancefor UnreportedOffshore Accounts and Entities, INT'L TAX
NEWSL. (DLA Piper), Mar. 31, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/
irs-issues-new-voluntary-disclosure-guidance-for-unreported-offshore-accountsand-entities/ ("In anticipation of the April 2, 2009, G-20 Summit Meeting, . . . the
United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany have sought to pressure
offshore financial centers to modify their bank secrecy laws.").
62 Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Streamlines Offshore Disclosure Process, TAX
NOTES TODAY, July 31, 2009, LEXIS, 2009 TNT 145-1.
63 The IRS reported that 14,700 taxpayers disclosed the existence of or
earnings from foreign financial accounts. See Kaplan, supra note 3.
6 See Parillo,supra note 62.
65 I.R.S., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, ORIGINAL FREQUENTLY ASKED

(May
QUESTIONS
revised_6 24.pdf.

6,

2009),

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/faqs-

6 I.R.S. Internal Revenue Manual IRM 9.5.11.9, Revised IRS Voluntary
Disclosure Practice (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=104361,00.html
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While the program does not guarantee immunity from
69
prosecution, it is the most effective way to avoid criminal penalties
and any non-compliant taxpayer who does not take advantage of the
VDI is likely to be prosecuted. 70 The IRS is pleased with the response
from VDI. 7
Declining to give exact numbers, Bruce Friedland, a

("(3) A voluntary disclosure occurs when the communication is truthful,
timely, complete, and when: (a) the taxpayer shows a willingness to cooperate
with the IRS in determining his/her tax liability; and (b) the taxpayer makes
good faith arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, the interest, and
any penalties determined by the IRS to be applicable.
(4) A disclosure is timely if it received before: (a) the IRS has initiated a
civil or criminal examination/investigation, or has notified taxpayer it intends
to commence such; (b) IRS has received information from a 3 rd party alerting
the IRS to a taxpayer's noncompliance; (c) IRS has initiated a civil or criminal
examination which is directly related to the specific liability of the taxpayer; or
(d) the IRS has acquired information directly related to the specific liability of
the taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action.").
67 IRS personnel may apply a new penalty framework to VDI requests
regarding previously unreported offshore entities and accounts. Under VDI, the
IRS assesses taxes and interest for the prior six-year period. Taxpayers are
required to file or amend all returns for the applicable period, including filing
the "Reports on Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts" (FBAR) form. Then
IRS assesses either an accuracy penalty or a delinquency penalty based on the
disclosure, unless the taxpayer can establish that a reasonable cause exception
applies. In lieu of all other applicable penalties (including FBAR inaccuracy
penalties, non-filing penalties, and other information return penalties), the IRS
will assess a penalty of 20% of the assets held in foreign bank accounts in the
year with the highest aggregate value. The penalty can be reduced to 5% for
some inherited accounts. See I.R.S., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=210027,00.html.
68 Bringing tax avoiding and tax evading taxpayers into compliance will
result in the collection of tax revenue otherwise lost due to the avoidance or
evasion activity. See id. at Q2 ("The objective is to bring taxpayers that have
used undisclosed foreign accounts and undisclosed foreign entities to avoid or
evade tax into compliance with United States tax laws.").
69
See id. at Q3.
70 For cases involving unreported offshore income in which the taxpayer
did not come in through the VDI, the IRS is "instructing [the] agents to fully
develop these cases, pursuing both civil and criminal avenues, and consider all
available penalties including the maximum penalty for the willful failure to file
the FBAR [foreign bank account] report and the fraud penalty." I.R.S., DEPT.
OF THE TREASURY, STATEMENT FROM IRS COMMISSIONER DOUG SHULMAN ON
2009),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
26,
INCOME (MAR.
OFFSHORE

article/0,,id=206014,00.html.
71See Parillo,supra note 62, at 3.
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spokesman for the IRS, stated that during the week of July 20, 2009
alone, the IRS received more than four hundred requests to participate
in the VDI. 72 That number represents more than four times the total
number of general pre-VDI voluntary disclosure requests received for
all of 2008." VDI succeeded in collecting numerous disclosures from
non-compliant taxpayers 74 without the IRS or Department of Justice
bringing civil or criminal charges. During the VDI period, the IRS also
pressured offshore banks to disclose the names of American depositors.
The first case was brought against large Swiss bank UBS AG.
2. THE UBS AG TAXPAYER DISCLOSURE CASE
UBS AG (UBS), headquartered in both Zurich and Basel,
Switzerland, manages over $2.3 trillion in assets and is among the
world's largest financial institutions. The 2008 PSI Report revealed
that many of UBS's U.S. clients refused to be identified and to have
U.S. taxes withheld. Also in the report, UBS stated that many of their
U.S. clients sold their U.S. assets after being required to report them
77
under the existing disclosure agreement between the U.S. and UBS.
UBS bankers allegedly assisted U.S. taxpayers in concealing their
78
identity as owners of assets in over nineteen thousand UBS accounts.
UBS created sham accounts in the names of offshore corporations,
trusts, foundations, or other entities in various jurisdictions and claimed
they were exempt from U.S.-UBS reporting requirements.7 ' The 2008

72

7

Id.
Id.

74 Laura Saunders & Anita Greil, Swiss Will Give Up the Names of U.S.
Taxpayers, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704431804574541461590575636.html?KEYWORDS=VoI

untary+disclosure+incentive.
75 UBS INA FEW WORDS, http://www.ubs.con/1/e/about/ourprofile.html
(last updated Dec. 10, 2010, 4:41 PM).
7

STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG.,
U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 10 (Subcomm. Print

REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND

July 17, 2008) (prepared by Chairman Carl Levin & Ranking Minority Member
Norm Coleman), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
n7 Id.

" Id. at 11, 16.
' See id. at 11.
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PSI Report alleges that UBS marketed and facilitated these tax-evasion
schemes to wealthy Americans. 80
At the 2008 PSI hearing, UBS representative, Mark Branson,
offered a number of concessions, including that UBS would no longer
provide offshore banking services to U.S. customers.8 1 The following
day, a Florida District Court granted the IRS permission to issue a John
Doe summons 82 to UBS for information regarding U.S. citizens who

so Bradley Birkenfeld, an American citizen and a UBS Geneva-based
director of wealthy U.S. clients with offshore accounts from 2001-2005, was at
the center of UBS's concealment services. Mr. Birkenfeld pled guilty to
helping a U.S. billionaire evade millions of dollars in federal taxes.
Birkenfeld's testified that UBS bankers used a variety of ruses to entice U.S.
clients to open up UBS offshore accounts and assist them in evading taxes. See
id at 83, 96
("(T]he private bankers from Switzerland who dealt with U.S. clients
typically traveled to the United States four to six times per year, using their
trips to search for new clients and provide financial services to existing clients.
... Mr. Birkenfeld testified that UBS not only authorized and paid for the
business trips to the united States, but also provided the Swiss bankers with
tickets and funds to go to events attended by wealthy U.S. individuals, so that
they could solicit new business for the bank in Switzerland.").
Birkenfeld stated that in his official position he served as a courier for
UBS clients, getting checks out of the U.S. and depositing them in accounts in
Denmark, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. Birkenfeld testified that he was fully
aware that what he was doing was illegal, but he did it anyway because of the
"incentives" UBS offered him. Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Please
Guilty
in
Tax
Evasion,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
20,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20tax.html.
81 See Evan Perez, UBS to shut down Swiss-based servicesfor its US clients,
WALL ST. J., July 17, 2008, http://www.efmancialnews.com/story/2008-07-17/
ubs-to-shut-down-swiss-based-services-for-its-us-clients (providing the statement
of Mark Branson, CFO of UBS Global Wealth Management and Business
Banking).
82 A "John Doe Summons" refers to "a summons from the [IRS] to a third
party to provide information on an unnamed, unknown taxpayer with potential
tax liability." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). See Press Release from
Carl Levin, U.S. Sen., Statement of Senator Carl Levin on Introducing the Stop
Tax Haven Abuse Act, Part I (Feb. 17, 2007), http://levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/release.cfm?id=269514 (explaining a John Doe summons is "tool
used by the IRS in recent years to uncover taxpayers in offshore tax schemes...
. [It] is an administrative IRS summons used to request information in cases
where the identity of the taxpayer is unknown. . . . To obtain approval of the
summons, [due to the IRS's inability to serve the taxpayer,] the IRS must show
the court, in public filings to be resolved in open court, that: (1) the summons
relates to a particular person or ascertainable class of persons, (2) there is a
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were UBS offshore clients that may have failed to meet reporting or
withholding obligations.83 Raoul Weil' Chairman and CEO of UBS
Global Wealth Management and Business Banking and a member of
the UBS Group Executive Board, was subsequently indicted by a
federal grand jury in connection with the ongoing Justice Department
85
investigation of UBS.84 He resigned his position at UBS.
UBS entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with
the Department of Justice,86 requiring UBS to pay $780 million in
fines, penalties, interest, and restitution for defrauding the U.S.
government.8 7 UBS waived indictment and consented to prosecution of
one criminal count for conspiracy to defraud the U.S under the
agreement.8 8 Provided UBS meets all obligations under the DPA, the
Department of Justice will recommend dismissal of the charge.89 The
DPA requires UBS to provide the identities and account information of
about two hundred and fifty non-compliant U.S. taxpayers. 90 Next, the

reasonable basis for concluding that there is a tax compliance issue involving
that person or class of persons, and (3) the information sought is not readily
available from other sources.").
83 In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, et al., No. 08-21864MC-Lenard/Garber (S.D. Fla., July 1, 2008) (explaining IRC § 7609(f) permits
the IRS to serve a John Doe summons upon a proper showing to the court.).
8 Indictment, United States v. Weil, No. 08-60322 (S.D. Fla., Nov. 12,
2008), 2008 WL 4898212. See also Carlyn Kolker & Ryan J. Donmoyer, UBS
Executive Weil Charged by U.S. in Tax Conspiracy (Update 3), BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 12, 2008 4:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601208&sid=a9920BUoGuF4 (publicizing Weil's indictment).
85 Statement on Indictment of UBS Executive, UBS (Nov. 12, 2008 10:00
http://www.ubs.com/l/e/mediaoverview/media-asiapacific/searchl/
PM),
searchl0?newsld= 157836.
86 See Hearingson Enforcement Issues, supra note 57 at 10; Dismissal of
Criminal Information, U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-600333-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla.,
Oct. 22, 2010); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter
DOJ DPA Announcement] http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2009/February/09-tax136.html.
8 See U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla.
July 7, 2009).
88 See Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues with Respect to Offshore
Accounts and Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 32 (2009)
(statement prepared by the Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation).
89 Id.

90 See DOJ DPA Announcement, supra note 86.
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Department of Justice filed a civil suit against UBS to compel them to
reveal the names of up to 52,000 U.S. clients. 91 UBS, backed by the
Swiss government, decided to withhold the names, reasoning that
disclosure "would breach bilateral tax agreements and Swiss bank
secrecy laws," 92 which make breaching client confidentiality a criminal
offense. 93 The United States took the position that if the court were to
enforce the John Doe summons, UBS subsequently failed to comply,
and consequently the court held UBS in contempt for failure to comply,
then UBS's noncompliance may be a material breach of the DPA. A
material breach of the DPA would have allowed the U.S. to proceed
with criminal prosecution of UBS. 94 Eventually, UBS blinked and
agreed to disclose the names of U.S. taxpayers with UBS accounts. 95
The UBS case serves as a deterrent to offshore banks from doing
business with U.S. taxpayers and also deters U.S. taxpayers from
investing offshore. Because of these disincentives, the UBS case has
made it less likely that U.S. taxpayers will invest overseas and more
likely they will invest domestically. As a result, the UBS case
represents a control on capital outflow. If U.S. taxpayers believe there
is a possibility that investing capital overseas may result in being
ensnared in an IRS civil and/or Department of Justice criminal
investigation, they are less likely to invest overseas. Even investors
that intend to be compliant may still have reasonable fears of a mistake
The cost of proving compliance is
resulting in legal trouble.
significant: requiring attorneys, accountants, and other professional
91 See U.S. Sues UBS to Disclose Customer Names, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Feb. 19, 2009, 2:42 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
02/19/us-sues-ubs-to-disclose-customer-names/; David Voreacos & Carlyn
Kolker, U.S. Sues UBS Seeking Swiss Account Customer Names (Update 4),
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2009, 5:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/

news?pid=20601087&sid=axZmpp36bOA&refer-home;

Lynnley Browning,

UBS Pressedfor 52,000 Names in 2nd Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht20ubs.20329685.html.
92 Pascal Fletcher & Lisa Jucca, UBS, US. Settle Tax Evasion Case,

REUTERS (Aug. 12, 2009,
idUSTRE57B2CF20090812.

2:37 PM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/

93 See Carolyn B. Lovejoy, UBS Strikes a Deal: The Recent Impact of
Weakened Bank Secrecy on Swiss Banking, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 435, 443,
446-47, (2010), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/journals/
articles/33.pdf.
94 Id. at 449-51.
9 See Tom Brown, US., UBS Breakthrough Averts Tax Dispute
Showdown, REUTERS (July 31, 2009, 6:38 PM) at 2, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE56U2ZY2009073 1.
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services. However, the U.S. was not content
the VDI compliance incentive and creating
tax enforcement penalty regime; the U.S.
capital control measures by passing new
disclosure regulations.

95

with merely implementing
a deterrent effect with its
Congress added to these
legislation to strengthen

3. THE HIRE ACT
In 2010, Congress passed the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment Act ("HIRE").96 HIRE imposes significant new burdens
on foreign financial institutions and other foreign investors that do
business with U.S. citizens. HIRE provides that every foreign financial
institution97 that receives payments of U.S. source income must comply
with new reporting requirements.9 8 This includes annually providing
the IRS with the name, address, taxpayer identification number,
account number, balance, gross receipts, and gross account
Failure to comply with the new reporting
withdrawals. 99
requirementstoo subjects the foreign entity to a 30% withholding tax on
any payment of U.S.-sourced investment income, including interest and
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
124 Stat. 71 (2010).
9 The term "foreign financial institution" is defined broadly as "any
foreign entity which (1) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of banking or a
similar business, (2) holds financial assets for the account of others as a
substantial portion of its business, or (3) is engaged primarily in the business of
investing, reinvesting or trading securities, partnership interests, commodities
or any interest on securities, partnership interests, and/or commodities." Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act, I.R.C. § 1471(d)(5) (2010); Rory M.
Cohen & Charles K. Kolstad, HIRE ACT = Higher Withholding Tax for
Foreign Entities, VENABLE LLP (April, 2010), http://www.venable.com/hireact--higher-withholding-tax-for-foreign-entities-04-16-2010/.
98 "A number of foreign financial institutions may already be treated as
Qualified Intermediaries (QI) for purposes of Section 1441 of the IRC; the rules
discussed above are in addition to those QI rules and must be complied with
separately." Rory M. Cohen & Charles K. Kolstad, HIRE ACT = Higher
Withholding Tax for Foreign Entities, VENABLE LLP (April, 2010),
http://www.venable.com/hire-act--higher-withholding-tax-for-foreign-entities04-16-2010/; Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, I.R.C. § 1441
(2010) (§ 1441 provides that payment of services to non-U.S. citizens, for
services performed in the U.S., are subject to tax withholding.)
9 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1)
(2010).
1"Id. at § 1471(b)(1).
96
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0
dividends.o'
The withholding tax provisions of HIRE effectively
override existing provisions of U.S. income tax treaties, resulting in the
imposition of the 30% withholding tax as the default method of
compliance in many situations.1 02 HIRE also applies to U.S. taxpayers
with more than $50,000 in reportable foreign assets, requiring
disclosure to the IRS of the maximum value of all foreign assets,
including specific financial account and security information.o 3 The
penalty for failing to meet these new disclosure requirements begins at
$10,000, with an additional 40% tax underpayment penalty on
underreported foreign assets.104

HIRE disclosure and associated penalties provide an additional
deterrent to U.S. investors maintaining assets offshore. The possibility
of making a mistake in the disclosures required by HIRE has such
negative financial consequences that many U.S. taxpayers may simply
choose not to invest outside the United States. Because of the
significant penalties for non-compliance placed upon foreign financial
institutions, U.S. taxpayers will be forced to record, gather, and report
an exorbitant amount of information that would not otherwise be
required if the investments were made domestically. This will act as a
sizable deterrent to enter into offshore transactions for both foreign
financial institutions as well as domestic taxpayers. As such, the
deterrent effect on U.S. financial institutions from this regulatory
regime has the same capital outflow control effects as the deterrent
effect created by the UBS case and the other offshore crackdown
measures.
C. THE CAPITAL OUTFLOW CONTROL EFFECTS OF THE U.S.
OFFSHORE CRA CKDOWN
The United States has a strong interest in collecting all taxes due
from its citizens, thus providing an understandable incentive for the
government to deter its citizens and foreign banks from evading U.S.
tax law. Congressional hearings and the resulting PSI reports; the VDI;
the UBS case (and resulting increased focus on civil and criminal
penalties); and new HIRE disclosure regulations are all efforts at
increasing offshore tax compliance. This increased emphasis on tax
l0oId. at

§ 1473 (1)(A)(i).

102 Foreign entities may avoid this withholding tax and the new reporting
requirements if they elect to report financial information as a U.S. financial
institution or meet certain exemptions. Id. at § 1472.
103 Id. at § 1474, Ch. 4, § 6038D(a).
'0 Id. at § 6038D(d)(1), (j)(3).
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enforcement has also had the effect of making U.S. taxpayers think
Whenever U.S.
twice about compliant overseas investments.
on a type of
focusing
resources
and
time
authorities spend significant
activity, the higher number of audits increases the chances that a
compliant taxpayer will be subject to an expensive audit because the
IRS has no system for ensuring that 100% of its audits are of noncompliant taxpayers. A compliant offshore investor attempting to
prove they are in compliance will expend considerable time, energy,
and money making compliance costs very high in the form of attorney
and accounting costs. Even in the absence of an investigation, legal,
accounting, and other professional services raise compliance costs for
offshore investors. Even an innocent reporting error could lead to a
high tax penalty. 05
Foreign banks may also limit access to U.S. investors in response
to the U.S. crackdown. Offshore banks may fear being subjected to the
scrutiny of the IRS or Department of Justice as a result of even
unintentional non-compliance by their clients. This may pose too much
of a burden for foreign banks to take the chance. 06 In particular, HIRE
may result in significant unintended and detrimental consequences for
U.S. investors. Accounting and reporting costs imposed on foreign
financial institutions and the potential loss of U.S. taxpayers as clients
are real added costs for these institutions. In the cost-benefit
calculation of complying with HIRE and the other offshore crackdown
measures, some foreign financial institutions may reduce or altogether
stop accepting U.S. clients.
There are legitimate tax enforcement and collection reasons for
of
the actions that the U.S. government has taken in the offshore
all
crackdown. An additional result of these actions is more U.S. taxpayer
capital remaining in or returning to domestic investments and accounts
in order to avoid high compliance costs and other consequences. The
VDI provided an opportunity for greater compliance at lower penalties
for those taxpayers who had previously evaded tax laws. It also
provided negative capital outflow pressure. HIRE, the UBS case, and
the other civil and criminal consequences, are examples of penalties
that theoretically may have dual tax enforcement and capital outflow
consequences. These policies collectively will result in U.S. taxpayers,

105 Id
1os Richard

W. Rahn, RAHN: Thoughtless Taxation, WASH. TIMES (Nov.
22, 2010, 5:43 PM) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/22/
thoughtless-taxation/.
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either by choice or by lack of access to offshore institutions, keeping
their investments onshore, thus having the same effect as a control on
net capital outflow.
IIL GOLD REGULATION AS CAPITAL CONTROL
A. THE PATIENTPROTECTIONAND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
OF 2010
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(ACA),10 7 requires corporations to fill out a IRS Form 1099 reporting
information about all consumers who buy or sell more than $600 worth
of goods or services. 08 One of the main industries burdened by this
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code is the gold industry.'09 With
a $600 threshold, this requirement is likely to cover nearly all
investments in gold made by U.S. investors because the current price of
gold would require a separate report for each purchase and sale of 0.43
ounces."10 The ACA is the principal vehicle for President Obama's
health care reform. In order to pay for the high government costs
associated with expanding health care coverage, Congress added
provisions to the ACA that would raise additional tax revenue,

107 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148; 124
Stat. 119(2010).
1os See I.R.C. § 6041 (2010). See also Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9006, 124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010) (amending §
6041 so that the term "person" for the purpose of the reporting requirements
now includes any corporation that is not otherwise exempt); Report to
Congress: Fiscal Year 2011 Objectives, 2010 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADvoc. 10

("[T]he new information reporting requirements are likely intended to detect
unreported income or gross proceeds.").
109 See Allen Sykora, US. Coin Dealers Anxious for Resolution of New
Form 1099 Rules, COMMODITY ONLINE (Mar. 5, 2011, 6:45 AM),

http://www.commodityonline.com/news/US-Coin-dealers-anxious-forresolution-of-new-Form-1099-rules-36966-3-1.html. See generally Coin and
Precious Metal DisclosureAct: Hearingon H.R. 6149 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, I1lth Cong. 55-58 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 6149]

(statement of Scott Carter, Exec. Vice President, Goldline Int'l) available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100923/ctcp/transcr
ipt.09.23.2010.ctcp.pdf (discussing a concurrent legislative effort to increase
mandatory disclosures required of dealers to protect consumers).
1o This is due to the fact that the current average price for gold is between
$1300 & $1450 an ounce. See Whittaker, supra note 10.
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including the Form 1099.1" The requirement of filling out IRS Form
1099 creates a traceable sale so as to report the potential tax liability on
behalf of the buyer. Since all sales of gold over $600 are reported, the
government will also have a complete record of the gold market;
including who is participating in the market on both sides, how much
they are purchasing, how frequently, and nearly all other aspects of
gold sales in the U.S.
The ACA adds compliance costs to the purchase of gold by small
investors. One significant gold coin dealer projected that it would file
as many as 20,000 Form 1099s per year under the new ACA
requirement.112 Recent Congressional hearings that looked into the
gold industry heard testimony that there are 5,000 serious gold
dealers." 3 If these estimates are correct, it is possible that the ACA
could result in tens of millions of Form 1099s being filed by gold
dealers. Even if the cost of filing a Form 1099 is only $100, this could
result in additional costs to the gold industry of between $5 Billion and
$10 Billion. Disregarding these costs, on November 29, 2010, the U.S.
Senate voted down two amendments that would have repealed the
reporting requirements under the ACA because the Senate could not
agree on a means to pay for the lost tax revenue generated by the
reporting requirement.11 4 On the same day, a report was released by the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Budget. It stated that
the new 1099 reporting requirements would raise around $2.5 billion in
tax revenue." 5 As these costs are passed on to gold investors, the

"1 See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budgetary Office,
to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader (Nov. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/docl0731/Reid letter 11 18 09.pdf ("In
total, CBO and JCT estimate that the legislation would ... increase revenues by
$486 billion between 2010 and 2019 . . .").
112 Pat Heller, owner of Liberty Coin Service in Lansing, Michigan, deals
with around 1,000 customers a week and projected that he will file between
10,000 and 20,000 1099s per year after the new tax law takes effect. Rich
Blake, Gold Coin Sellers Angered by New Tax Law, ABC NEWS (June 21,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/gold-coin-dealers-decry-tax-law/
2010),
story?id=1 1211611.
" Hearing on H.R. 6149, supra note 109, at 55.
114 Eric Kroh, Senate Votes Down Amendments to Repeal Expanded 1099
Reporting, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 30, LEXIS, 2010 TNT 229-1.
115 REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 111TH CONG., THE

SMALL BUSINESS JOBS AND CREDIT ACT: SMALL BUSINESSEs STRUGGLE, WHILE

CONGRESS SPENDS FREELY

(Comm. Print Sept. 22, 2010) (prepared by Dana T.
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transaction costs necessarily must increase exponentially, reducing
overall gold demand and nudging investors into other domestic
investments.
B. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTIONACT OF 2010
1. NEW REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFRA),"' 6 has certain investors
concerned that the U.S. government is slowly implementing capital
controls on gold by implementing new disclosure obligations.'" 7 First,
DFRA redefines "accredited investor," as it relates to natural persons
under the Securities Act of 1933, so that the definition excludes the
value of a primary residence from an investor's net worth."' This
change may substantially increase the net worth threshold to qualify as
an accredited investor and allow the SEC to impose disclosure
obligations on companies who offer securities to these wealthy
investors.'" 9 Second, DFRA requires buyers of gold and other minerals
to report annually where they purchased the minerals from to ensure
that they were not purchased in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) or adjoining countries to the DRC.120 The purpose of this
DFRA provision is to reduce the capital available for the financing of
wars.12' Third, § 742(a) of the DFRA prohibits any individual or

Wade, Budget Analyst for Financial Markets, Republican Caucus),
http://budget.house.gov[UploadedFiles/smallbusinessbill.pdf.
116 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
"1 See, Ian MacGregor & Martin Fisher-Haydis, So You Thought DoddFrank Was Just About FinancialIndustry Reform?, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS.

http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=
2010),
13,
(Sept.
1202471905864&SoYou ThoughtDoddFrankWasJust About FinancialI
ndustry Reform.
11 DFRA § 413.
U.S.

Hedge Fund Reform: Investor Protection Provisions,
3, 2010), http://www.hedgeco.net/news/08/2010/u-s(Aug.
HEDGECO.NET
hedge-fund-reform-investor-protection-provisions.html.
120 DFRA § 1502.
121See, Brandon Prosansky, Mining Gold in a Conflict Zone: The Context,
Ramifications, and Lessons of AngloGold Ashanti's Activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5 Nw. U.J. INT'L. HUM. RTs. 236, 265-70
(2007).
119

2010]

THE CURE CAUSES NEW SYMPTOMS:
CAPITAL CONTROL EFFECTS OF TAx ENFORCEMENT,
GOLD REGULATION, AND RETIREMENT REFORM

101

company from offering or entering into a transaction involving any
commodity, including precious metals like gold, with a person that is
not an "eligible" counterparty. 122 To be "eligible," the counterparty
must also be DFRA compliant.123 Therefore, DFRA § 742(a)
specifically limits the possible participants in the precious metal
market.
2. REDUCING GOLD INDUSTRY COMPETITORS
The gold market may be further limited by additional regulations
adopted pursuant to recent Congressional hearings. On September 23,
2010, the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection held a hearing to discuss legislation that would further
regulate gold dealers.124 During the hearing, Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA)
asked a testifying witness if new disclosure requirements would reduce
the number of market competitors.' 25 The witness was concerned that
the bill "might encourage unscrupulous marketers to collude and set
prices."l 26 Furthermore, Rep. Scalise clarified that the language of the
bill actually tolerates this collusion, which could ultimately cause a
reduction in the number of market competitors to the detriment of the
consumer.127 With this theory, the consumer is likely to suffer
When
increased cost from restricted market participation.128
competition is reduced to a smaller number of businesses in an
industry, the remaining industry leaders are likely to raise prices.129
122
123

DFRA
Id.

§ 742

Hearing on HR. 6149, supra note 109 (discussing the Coin and
Precious Metal Disclosure Act).
125 Id. at 55 (statement of Scott Carter, Exec. Vice President, Goldline
Int'l).
126 Id at 80.
124

127id

128 Regulation can have the effect of limiting the number of market
For example, licensing requirements or other approval
participants.
mechanisms may have this effect by increasing the barriers to being an
approved market participant (i.e., the cost and burden of becoming licensed or
approved). Fewer market participants reduce competition, which can result in
increased prices. Additionally, the cost of compliance may be passed on to
consumers.
129 See, e.g., David Sheppard & Joshua Schneyer, World Oil Demand
Growth to Outpace Supply in 2010: Poll, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2008, 8:09 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AN26920091124.
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3. COMPLIANCE COSTS
These reporting requirements and restrictions will cause U.S.
gold dealers to incur substantial compliance costs. 130 Although the
exact cost of DFRA compliance is unknown, there is evidence that the
impact is likely to be highl 3' and the burden is likely to be felt
disproportionately by small gold dealers.132 The government has
historically substantially underestimated compliance costs associated
with federal regulations.' 33 DFRA § 742(a) requires gold dealers to
incur the additional regulatory costs related to researching the source of
the gold, the background of the seller, and how the law applies to both
answers.134
Since small gold dealers have fewer financial resources than
larger gold dealers, smaller gold dealers are likely to be
disproportionately impacted by these due diligence requirements. The
number of small gold dealers will likely be substantially diminished as
their marginal profits are squeezed by the cost of regulation.1 35 Small
dealers will pass increased costs onto investors,' 36 which will
disproportionately affect small investors who generally buy in the
130 See generally MacGregor & Fisher-Haydis, supra, note 117.
13' id.

132 In a 2005 Report for the Small Business Administration, W. Mark
Crain of the Lafayette College in Pennsylvania concluded that the cost of tax
compliance in small firms (with under 20 employees) is sixty-seven (67%)
percent higher than in large firms (with 500 or more employees). W. Mark
Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, U.S. SMALL Bus.

ADMIN., 2 (Sept. 2005), http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf.
133 The Office of Management and Budget is required to submit an
accounting statement and report that includes estimates of the annual costs and
benefits of federal rules, to the extent feasible. Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L.
106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763, 27643A-161 (2000). The Office of
Management and Budget reported to Congress the total costs of federal
regulations to be between $34 - $39 billion (in 2001 dollars), as distinguished
from the figures set forth by (1) the Small Business Administration and (2)
Mark Crain and Thomas Hopkins who estimate the costs of regulation (for the
same period with the same dollar base) to be between $777 - $876 billion.
Crain, supra note 132, at 1-2.
13' DFRA § 742(a).
"s

Hearingon H.R. 6149, supra note 109, at 55 (statement of Scott Carter,

Exec. Vice President Goldline Int'l); see also Wade, supra note 115 (arguing
that small business struggling with the filing requirements may find compliance
to be financially burdensome and eliminate their business).
136

Mankiw, supra note 24.
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smaller amounts from small dealers.' 3 7 Thus, the cost of regulation will
likely reduce competition as small dealers and small investors are
priced out of the gold market.
4. DOMESTIC CAPITAL OUTFLOW CONTROL
In short, increased regulations created by DFRA will result in
fewer gold dealers and higher prices as the remaining dealers pass their
regulatory costs to investors. These higher costs will deter potential
investors, especially small investors, from investing domestic capital.
Investors who otherwise may have invested in gold may decide that
higher transaction costs reduce their potential profits in the investment
and the risk that the gold is derived from a war zone raises other
potential regulatory risks since such gold is illegal under the DFRA.'n

Additional regulation will likely deter gold investment, which may
cause investors to look to other domestic investment opportunities,
such as U.S. treasury bonds; this shift will diminish capital outflow.
IV. THE GUARANTEED RETIREMENT ACCOUNT PROPOSAL
A. GUARANTEED RETIREMENTACCOUNTS

The Guaranteed Retirement Account (GRA) proposal would
create a retirement account for every American who is not currently

enrolled in a retirement saving vehicle like a 401(k) plan or IRA.139
The GRA proposal requires taxpayers make a contribution to the GRA

each year equal to 5% of the taxpayer's income up to the Social
Security earnings cap.14 0 The employer would pay 2.5% of the 5%
contribution and the taxpayer would pay the other 2.5%.141 These

'3n See generally Larry Light, Catching the Gold Bug, WALL ST. J. (July
15, 2009, 11:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702035773045
74275953355412882.html?KEYWORDS=Catching+the+Gold+Bug#.
138 Generally, the longer an investor holds an investment the more
volatility the investment may be subject to on the market. See id.
139 Ghilarducci, supra note 13, at 2.
140 See id. In 2010, the Social Security earnings cap
is set at 6.2% of up to

$106,800 for each the employee and the employer or 12.4% for the selfemployed. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUBLICATION No. 05-10003 (2011),
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10003.html.
141 Ghilarducci, supra note 13,
at 2-3.
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payments would be directly deducted from earnings in payroll taxes.14 2
As an incentive, the U.S. government will contribute $600 toward
every participating taxpayer's 2.5% contribution in the form of a
refundable tax credit.14 3 To pay for the credit, current tax benefits for
The Social Security
401(k) plans would be eliminated. 1"
Administration would administer the GRAs, and the funds would be
managed by the Thrift Savings Plan or a similar body.145 Under the
plan, the government would guarantee a fixed return of three percent
annually adjusted for inflation.146 Much like Social Security and
defined benefit retirement plans of the past, upon retirement the GRA
would produce a fixed stream of income by converting contributions to
a guaranteed lifetime annuity.147 Additionally, in order to facilitate the
significant transition from privately held Section 401(k) accounts to
GRA accounts, which are more readily available for government use, a
principal proponent of GRAs has testified in Congressional hearings
that Congress should seek to shift private Section 401(k) investments
into government-issued treasury securities.148 Essentially, this would
function as a "rollover" 49 of retirement accounts that are in existence at

42

1
143

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3 (noting that the offset will be receivable in refundable tax

credit).
'"Id.
145 Teresa Ghilarducci proposes the funds in GRAs be attached to
identifiable individual accounts, but pooled together under the management of
either the Social Security Administration or the Thrift Savings Plan, which is
the public sector qualified plan under IRC regulations similar to those of 401(k)
plans. Id.
146 id.

147 Id. at 2-3; see also Proposalsfor a New Retirement System, RET. USA,
(October 3, 2010), http://www.retirement-usa.org/proposals-new-retirementsystem.
148 Teresa Ghilarducci is a scholar who is frequently a witness on behalf of
GRAs in Congressional hearings. Ms. Ghilarducci stated in her 2008
Congressional testimony that Congress should work to convert 401(k) plan
assets into GRAs composed of government bonds. Hearing on Workers'
Retirement Security, supra note 13, at 32 (statement of Teresa Ghilarducci,
Irene and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Econ. Policy Analysis, The New
Sch. for Soc. Research, Dep't of Econ).
149 "Rollover" is a common financial services industry term. 401(k)
savings are "rolled over" when an employee leaves a place of employment and
is thus no longer eligible to participate in the firm 401(k) plan, or when the
employee chooses to move retirement funds into a similarly qualified IRA.
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the time of the initiation of GRA accounts. Staff for key members of
50
Congress have made GRAs part of the retirement reform discussion.1
B. THE GRA AS AN INTERNAL DOMESTIC CAPITAL CONTROL
When discussing GRAs, Congressional proponents list stateand propose
worker retirement security as the primary objective
GRAs as a compliment to Social Security.152 However, Congress has
been borrowing capital from the Social Security Trust Fund for current
non-Social Security spending for a very long time.1 5 3 According to the
Social Security Administration, tax income collected is deposited into
the U.S. Treasury general fund, converted into "special issue" securities
54
and is virtually indistinguishable from other cash in the general fund.1
Currently it is estimated that the U.S. Treasury is over obligated (above
expected tax revenues) to Social Security expenditures in excess of
$7.7 trillion over the next 75 years.'15 The implementation of GRAs
would lead to the federal government having an entirely new piggy
bank to raid for current spending needs.
To obtain access to this new capital, GRA-backers propose
eliminating tax incentives for Section 401(k) plans to offset the costs of
Mike DeCesare, Press Secretary for Rep. Jim McDermontt (D-WA) of
the U.S. Ways and Means Committee called Ms. Ghilarducci's GRA plan
"intriguing" and "is part of the discussion" when Congress discusses the restructuring of the current retirement system. Sara Hansard, House Democrats
150

Contemplate Abolishing 401(k) Tax Breaks, INVESTMENT NEWS (Oct. 12, 2008,

6:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article20081012/REG/310139971.
151 Hearing on Workers' Retirement Security, supra note 13, at 4-6

(opening statement of Hon. George Miller, Chairman, Comm. of Educ. and
Labor).
152 Id.; see also, Joe Biden, 2009 Annual Report of the White House Task
Force on the Middle Class, WHITE HouSE, at 28, (Feb. 2010),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/100226-annual-reportmiddle-class.pdf
1 Sahadi, supra note
15.
154 "Special issue" is divided into two types of indebtedness, short-term
certificates of indebtedness, which expire on the following June 30th; and
bonds, which range from one to fifteen years and expire on the following June
30th, both of only available to the U.S.'s Old-Age and Survivor Insurance Fund
and Disability Insurance Fund. TRUST FUND FAQS, supra note 15.
155 Bruce Bartlett, How Much Does the National Debt Matter?,

FORBES.COM (March 5, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/04/
consumer-debt-deficit-budget-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html.
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funding the GRAs.' 6 Section 401(k) plans would cease to be funded
without these tax incentives because there would be no advantage to
funding them. Without the tax incentives, Section 401(k) plans would
just become an investment account with a great deal of restrictions on
the accounts.' 57 Private funds more traditionally directed to 401(k) and
tax incentivized defined-contribution plans would instead be directed
into required government-sponsored retirement accounts run like Social
Security.' 58 A transition from mixed global and domestic market
portfolios, platforms traditionally found in 401(k) plans with stock
market exposure, to U.S. treasury investments will not only suppress
expected returns, but will also decrease foreign investment. There may
be a decrease in expected returns since U.S. Treasury returns hover
around 3 percent annually, while the stock market return is generally
higher. 5 9
Consequently, implementing the GRA proposal would act as a
large domestic capital outflow control as private investment retirement
vehicles are shifted to government-managed investments, which
provide the U.S. government with a source for borrowing capital in the
future. A recent report by the Spectrem Group showed assets in
defined-contribution plans such as Section 401(k) to be valued around
$4.5 trillion in 2009.160 This movement of capital into government
investments would only be accelerated if the GRAs were to be funded
by U.S. Treasury bonds as the GRA sponsors propose.

1s6 Hearing on Workers' Retirement Security, supra note 13, at 32

(statement of Teresa Ghilarducci, Irene and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of
Econ. Policy Analysis, The New Sch. for Soc. Research, Dep't of Econ).
15 401(k) accounts are retirement plans the IRS provides for in the
Internal Revenue Code, where the IRS sets forth minimum standards for
qualified plans. The IRS establishes: who is eligible for plan participation;
when participants have a non-forfeitable right to their plan benefits; how much
may be contributed to the plan by both the participant and the employer; and
when and how distributions from the plan may be made. See I.R.S., DEPT. OF
THE TREASURY,
QUALIFICATION

401(K) RESOURCE GUIDE - PLAN
REQUIREMENTS
(Oct.

SPONSORS
29,

-

PLAN
2010),

http://www.irs.gov/retirement/sponsor/article/0,,id=151924,00.html.
158 Id
159 TRUST FUND FAQs, supra note 15.
'6

Darrell A. Hughes, Republicans Warn Against Change to 401(k)

Policy, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB 10001424052748703866704575224511840462980.html.
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V. CONCLUSION

The U.S. has spent several years using investigatory, taxing,
prosecutorial, legislative, and regulatory powers to create inducements
and penalties to direct U.S. investors to preferred investments. The
government began with the 2006 PSI hearings' 6 1 and reports. 162 Focus
on offshore investments continued with the UBS 163 case and with the
enactment of the HIRE Act,M both of which create a significant
deterrent to U.S. taxpayer investment abroad.165 Next the United States
turned its attention to domestic investment vehicles and asset classes by
enacting strict and burdensome regulations on the gold industry. The
disclosure regime requires all businesses to issue an IRS Form 1099 for
each sale of goods or services in excess of $600.166 Gold companies
are thus required to report purchaser information to the IRS for each
sale of gold in excess of $600 (as little as 0.43 ounces as of December
1, 2010),167 as well as reporting sales of gold to U.S. citizens from
certain sources.' 6 8 This regime will significantly increase compliance
costs that will be passed on to investors. Gold dealers are also
restricted from contracting with certain sources of gold,169 which will
161Press Release from Carl Levin, U.S. Sen., Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations Issues Report On Offshore Tax Haven Abuses That Cost U.S.
Taxpayers Over $40 Billion Each Year (August
1, 2006),
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=260030.
162 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH
CONG., REP. ON TAx HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY

(Subcomm. Print Aug. 1, 2006) (prepared by Chairman Norm Coleman &
Ranking Minority Member Carl Levin), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
supporting/2006/PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf; STAFF OF S. PERMANENT
SUBcOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND

U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE (Subcomm. Print July 17, 2008) (prepared by Chairman
Carl Levin & Ranking Minority Member Norm Coleman), http://hsgac.senate.gov/
public/ files/071708PSIReport.pdf
i6T Kevin McCoy, IRS: Offshore Tax Crackdown Should Produce
'Billions, 'USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2009, 12:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/

money/perfiltaxes/2009-11-17-offshore-tax-evaders-irsN.htm.
1 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
124 Stat. 71 (2010).
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reduce the number of gold dealers in the market. These additional
regulations are likely to cause U.S. investors to avoid the gold market.
Overall, investors are likely to seek alternative investments.
Retirement vehicles and investment regimes are another
domestic focus during the last few years. Congress has held several
hearings in which witnesses have testified regarding a plan to exchange
the existing Section 401(k) tax incentive system for a Guaranteed
Retirement Account ("GRA") systemo7 0 run in the same manner as
Social Security. 7' The likely resulting decimation of the Section
401(k) system may cause a massive capital transfer from private
retirement account investments to a government-run and managed
retirement system consisting of Social Security and GRAs-which may
be an inviting target for Congress to borrow against in order to fund
future budget deficit spending in much the same way as Congress has
historically borrowed against the Social Security Trust Fund.172 This
temptation is particularly problematic as the U.S. Treasury is currently
73
in debt to the Social Security Trust Fund in excess of $2.5 trillion.'
The United States has legitimate articulated reasons for
implementing tax enforcement overseas, creating consumer protection
regulations for the booming gold industry, and reforming the
diminished retirement account system. However, these measures also
have a capital control effect on U.S. investors. The regulations,
incentives, taxes, and civil and/or criminal penalty threats all urge U.S.
investors to invest domestically (instead of offshore), in assets other
than gold, and in assets where the government potentially controls the
capital (GRAs). It is not possible to determine whether this capital
control effect is planned or unintentional; however the current U.S.
budget and debt crises may be contributing factors in the U.S.
government's decision to embark on a broad array of capital control
measures to harness the investment potential of American assets.
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